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Discussing Corporate Misbehavior

THE CONFLICTING NORMS OF MARKET, AGENCY,
PROFIT AND LOYALTY'

Daniel J. H. Greenwood
I.

INTRODUCTION

Corporate law remains thin, but corporate law
scholarship is thickening. This Symposium is both a symbol of
and a major contribution to that process. We are stepping
beyond the narrow models of rationally maximizing fictional
shareholders and purely self-interested managers competing in
an evolutionarily determined and purely individualistic market
inevitably maximizing social wealth through the pursuit of
private profit. Instead, new scholarship is taking a richer
perspective infused with the insights of group and individual
psychology, recognitions of institutional realities, and broader
conceptions of the social good.
American corporate law restricts itself to a limited view
of the public corporation. In state corporate law, a corporation
consists of little more than directors and shares,1 with the
© 2005 Daniel J. H. Greenwood. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, S. J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. My
deepest thanks to Jim Fanto, Larry Solan, Brooklyn Law School and the Sloane
Foundation for organizing and making possible this fascinating Symposium and to the
participants and Leslie Francis, Daniel Medwed and Manuel Utset for helpful
comments.
I use the term 'share" rather than the more common "shareholder" because
corporate law and scholarship alike normally ignore the portfolios and people who own
the shares (i.e., the shareholders), instead focusing on a purely imaginary creature
with no views, interests or desires other than maximizing the value of the particular
corporate stock at issue. In corporate law, then, the term "shareholder" while
misleadingly invoking images of a human being, actually refers only to a role. See
generally Daniel

J. H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: "For Whom
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occasional cameo appearance of creditors of a firm near
bankruptcy, or managers as the secret doppelgangers of the
inside directors. The issues of central concern to the law are
similarly restricted: the formal voting rights of shares, the
ultimate power of the directors to manage the corporation and
the limited exception granted to shares to sue derivatively, the
directors' limited fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shares, and some cameo appearances of other legal values
when shares and directors are at odds over takeovers. Even in
these areas, corporate law is famously "enabling," "towering
skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and
containing nothing but wind."2
When corporate law has entered the normative thicket,
it has usually been to enforce the thin view of its purposes: to
define shareholder interests as the interests of the role, rather
than the human beings who inhabit it, and to force managers
to restrict their view of the corporation's interests to those of
these legally constructed fictional shareholders.' ERISA and
the fiduciary and agency rules regulating the decision-makers
for most institutional shareholders (that is, the holders of most
shares), often require them to act as if their only concern were
maximizing returns to undiversified shareholding in the
particular corporation. Moreover, corporate law gives directors
and shares the right to sell corporate control without consent of
other corporate constituencies. Combined with the anonymous
market for publicly traded stock, this creates vast market
pressure to run the firm in the manner most likely to be
rewarded by the stock market. And (at least since the demise of
the conglomerate fad of the 1960s) the stock market has
generally bid up the stock prices of corporations that
CorporationManaged," Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1021 (1996). Moreover, voting in a
corporation is on the basis of one share one vote, rather than one shareholder one vote;
here too the term 'shareholder" tends to mislead, giving the appearance of democracy
where there is at best plutocracy.
2 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
' See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (declaring that the
purpose of the corporation is to earn returns for its shares, regardless of the expressed
views of the majority shareholder); State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc. 191 N.W.
2d 406 (Minn. 1971) (declaring illegitimate attempt of shareholder to cause corporation
to consider values other than profit-maximization); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) (requiring managers, under limited
circumstances, to pretend that shareholders have no interests other than the value of
their shares, and to run the corporation in those legally defined interests). More often,
however, corporate law's business judgment rule removes the issue of corporate
purpose from judicial purview.
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demonstrate a decent respect for the opinions of institutional
shareholders and show a keen focus on identifying corporate
interests with stock market interests.
Other areas of the law regulate other aspects of the
public corporation, but generally without consideration of the
specific characteristics of corporations as such. Thus, securities
law, in general, protects securities holders as outsiders,
consumers of a product produced by the corporation, creating
rights to information in the manner of a truth-in-packaging
law.' Environmental law, constitutional law, criminal law,
labor law and so on, generally regulate the corporation as a
"person," ignoring its collective and corporate character and
subjecting it to norms created for citizens without much
consideration of special issues of organizational behavior.'
But public corporations are not individuals. They are
large bureaucratic organizations, no more likely to respect
individual rights or needs than the large bureaucratic
organizations of the state, and generally a good deal less
responsive to the views of the majority or those they affect.
General American law starts from a basic distinction between
state and citizen, public and private-but we have placed our
large public business corporations on the private, citizen side of
the divide, as if we needed rights for them rather than rights
against them, or as if we existed for their sake rather than they
for ours. Since the fundamental foundation of the individualist
liberal political theory on which our polity is based is the
recognition that groups and organizations often do not act as
the individuals in them would like them to, this conflation of
corporations with people is strange, to say the least.
' Even the Williams Act, which edges into regulation of the firm's internal
decision-making processes while retaining the form of consumer protection by
disclosure regulation, strikingly avoids substantive discussion of how, by and for whom
corporations are run.
' The corporate income tax scheme also treats the corporation as a person or
entity, taxing the corporation's income just as it taxes any other person's income. The
current attack on so-called "double taxation" however, seems to be premised on the
claim that the corporation can be reduced completely to its shareholders, so that its
income is theirs even though they have no right to receive or control it. This revisionist
view rejects both the person/entity view most commonly seen in regulatory statutes in
favor of corporate law's currently dominant view of the firm as a "moment in the
market" with no institutional existence. As should be apparent, neither of these views
are compatible with a perspective that takes the institutional reality of the firm
seriously. A serious discussion of taxation of public corporations would have to begin by
discarding rhetorical claims that the corporation is a person like any other or doesn't
exist and instead to confront the near impossibility of determining the actual impact of
corporate income tax on corporate participants in increased prices or reduced payments
(salary, dividend, interest or prices).
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Corporate law scholarship in the last quarter of the
millennium both celebrated the limited protection the law
offers and narrowed the scope of its own concerns even further.
Its psychological theory began, and usually ended, with
a model of rational profit maximizers borrowed from neoclassical economics. Shareholders were modeled as one-sided
fictions with no interests or values other than increasing the
value of the stock they hold in a single corporation-as if they
were undiversified aliens or colonial occupiers with no interest
in the society they sought to exploit. Directors and managers
were reduced to self-interested cynics who must be coerced or
paid obscene amounts to do their jobs or observe minimal
professional norms. Other employees simply disappeared from
view altogether, except perhaps as tools to be maximally
exploited.
Its normative concerns sometimes seemed restricted to
no more than a debate between advocates of idolatry-viewing
every idiosyncrasy of legally regulated markets as sacred-and
plutocracy-seeking to ensure, market or no, that an ever
increasing slice of the corporate pie was served to the capital
markets.
Sociologically, in the leading models, the firm itself
seemed at times to lose its corporeality, as "nexus of contracts"
models made the institution invisible, no more than a collection
of individuals meeting in a collection of moments to exchange
and then depart again into the "woods of America ... perfectly
in a state of nature."
In the last decade, however, we have moved into a new
era. Corporate law scholars have begun to recognize that we
must take into account the learning of real psychology, that we
must understand group interactions outside the narrow bounds
of neo-classical individualism, that the organization has
' JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 295 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) (1690). Locke here follows Thomas Hobbes' description of
the state of mutual disinterestedness-war-between individuals in America and
anywhere else "where there were no common Power to feare." THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 65 (Prometheus 1988) (1651) . Hobbes' portrait of man in the state of
nature is closely related to the usual models of motivation used in classic late twentieth
century corporate law. As he describes it, in the absence of relationship or government:
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that
nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice
have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law:
where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall
vertues.
Id. at 66
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behaviors and meanings that can no more be reduced to the
individuals in it than government can be reduced to the
governed, that ethical issues may be more complex than simply
not stealing from shareholders (and stealing as much as
possible for them).
The essay proceeds as follows. Part II uses Professor
Linda Trevifto's contribution to this Symposium, which details
the important ways in which a corporate CEO influences the
rule-abidingness of his subordinates, as a reminder that
corporate law must consider the sociological institution of the
firm, not merely the limited roles which we usually emphasize.
Part III explores Professor John Darley's contention that
people in firms seem unduly "recruitable into corrupt practices"
and discusses how people in corporate roles often seem to
conclude that the right thing is the wrong thing to do. Part IV
takes the idea of role based norms one step further: The
corporation, I contend, functions at the intersection of radically
different market and fiduciary norms and is inherently a locus
of normative conflict. Thus, corporate wrongdoing is as likely to
result from the wrong norm in the wrong place (including but
not limited to the team spirit, internal culture and loyalty that
Professors Trevifio and Darley discuss) as from selfishness,
corruption or other forms of explicitly bad behavior. Part V
discusses the ways in which corporations can mediate these
normatively conflicts, successfully or not. Part VI concludes
with some preliminary suggestions for further research and
law reform.

II.

THE ROLE OF THE

CEO

Professor Trevifio and others have demonstrated that
CEO behavior critically affects firm ethics. When the CEO acts
ethically and creates institutional structures that make clear to
other employees that the firm values ethical behavior, the firm
acts more ethically.
Over the course of the last three decades, CEO pay has
risen astronomically in the United States, from perhaps 24
times the average employee's pay in 1965 to 300 times by the
turn of the century.7 With our CEOs now paid so much more
' LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2004/2005, at

212-216 & figure 2Y. See also Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four
Hundred for C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File
Workers, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 116 n.4 (2002) (stating that in 2000, average
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than the rest of us (and even than comparable CEOs in other
countries'), a cottage industry has sprung up defending the
high compensation. Institutional shareholders were persuaded
by agency theory arguments that high, stock-based pay for
CEOs would cause higher CEO productivity: By tying CEO
incentives to share price performance, high pay would lessen
CEO shirking, thereby increasing returns for shares After the
pay increases, the standard neo-classical model of wage setting
for employees provided an equal and opposite justification: A
profit-maximizing company would hire someone only if their
pay is lower than their contribution to the firm's profit. On the
"best of all possible worlds" view of this perfect market theory,
it seems to follow that high CEO pay must result from high
CEO productivity. Combined, the theories contend that
American CEOs are paid more than their foreign counterparts
and their predecessors because they are doing a better job.'"
But with high compensation should come high
responsibility. All that pay must be for something. It has been

CEO compensation was 531 times the pay of the average blue collar worker). Another
way to see the same phenomenon is that average hourly wages were up 10% in real
terms between 1989 and 2000, while average CEO compensation increased 342% in
that period. MISHEL, supra,at 113 tbl. 2.1, 213 tbl. 2.46.
American CEO pay is almost as unequal as American income generally.
Accordingly, average CEO compensation is vastly higher than median CEO
compensation (in 2000, $11.194 million vs. $3.101 million). MISHEL, supra, at 213.
Median CEO compensation of $3.6 million in 2003 was 336 times the $10,712 a full
time worker would earn at minimum wage ($5.15/hr, 8 hours/day, 260 days/year) and
101 times average 2002 wages of $35,424. MISHEL, supra, at 113.
' Stabile, supra note 7, at 121 n.22; MISHEL, supra note 7, at 214, 215 tbl.
2.47 (stating that US CEOs are paid roughly three times as much as their counterparts
in other developed countries).
' See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives- It's Not
How Much You Pay, But How, 68 HARV. Bus. REV. 138 (1990). Agency theory
suggested that tying CEO pay to stock performance would make CEOs more
entrepreneurial. In my view, the changes in CEO pay probably did increase
shareholder gains, but the incentive theory seems unduly mechanical. Instead, high
pay alone, as well as vastly increased stock holdings, has changed CEO views of the
team for which they play. The modern CEO is far less likely to identify with the
bureaucracy he heads and far more likely to identify with his peers heading other
corporations. Moreover, as CEOs become increasingly wealthy and increasingly large
stockholders (both in their own company and the market generally), they are less likely
to think of themselves as professionals and more likely to think as investors or owners.
These reorientations make it less likely for CEOs to identify the interest of the firm
with the interest of its employees. They, however, also make it more likely for CEOs to
view their role inside the firm cynically and, in some instances, to abandon team
playing altogether. For further discussion, see Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis,2004
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 773, 802 (2004).
1" See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the InternationalCEO Pay Gap,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (2004) (noting that US executives are paid more than
their foreign counterparts and explaining it as reflecting greater productivity).
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startling, then, to see the alacrity with which the CEOs on the
"perp walk" (as Professor Trevihio terms it) have adopted a
defense based on ignorance. Apparently, we are supposed to
believe that CEOs earn their enormous compensation through
their ability to make the organization more productive, while
simultaneously accepting that they really have no idea what is
going on in their organization, even at the basic level of
whether the organization is actually producing or just faking it.
On this view, ignorance is a defense, even for those whose
business is knowledge. As in My Lai or Abu Ghraib, the upper
echelons deny any connection to crimes committed by their
underlings: Those designing institutions insist that they should
be entitled to assume that those below them will act
appropriately in all circumstances regardless of institutional
pressures, temptations or norms."
Professor Trevifho shows that, at least in the corporate
world, we should just say no. Whether CEOs like it or not (and
whether or not it fits into the thin theories of corporate
behavior based on rational maximization), institutional ethics
are largely under CEO control. CEO behavior matters. CEO
talk matters. CEO silence matters. Organizational structures
implemented by CEOs matter.
Professor Trevifto maintains that most corporate actors
are not fully autonomous rule-following ethicists unaffected by
the norms and expectations of those around them. Instead, like
most adults, they tend to conform their behavior to the norms
they believe are expected of them. Since CEOs are
instrumental in creating those expectations and the
institutions that back them up, they are instrumental in
determining how employees will behave.
" For a recent corporate law discussion of this issue, see In re Caremark
International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970-71 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Caremark limited the old Delaware rule, set out in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co,
188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963), that "absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon
the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out
wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists," Graham, 188 A.2d at 130,
holding that directors have a "duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists" In re
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970, and that liability may be found if directors "utter[lyl failf
to attempt to assure" such a system exists. Id. at 971 By focusing on "information and
reporting," id., Caremark continues to operate on a background assumption that
wrongdoing occurs independent of corporate structure or internal corporate norms.
Note however that Caremark involves board liability. Boards might reasonably be
expected to have less responsibility for the firm's behavior than CEOs, who unlike
directors are full-time employees of the firm with primary responsibility for creating
and operating its structures.
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Corporate law generally treats corporate ethics as
outside of its scope, as if the structures created and regulated
by corporate law had no significant influence on ethical
behavior or as if those structures were outside the realm of
corporate law. Companies and their employees may follow the
rules or they may not. For corporate law (like criminal law), the
firm is black box. These areas of the law look just to the
results-if things do not work out, the firm will not be
competitive or the regulators will stop it. But Professor
Trevifio's work, like the other work presented at this
Symposium, suggests that we needn't be so agnostic. We know
how to influence the degree of corporate ethical behavior, and
we could mandate better processes than the ones we allow.
III.

SHARES
OF
COMPOSED
CORPORATIONS
CORPORATIONS COMPOSED OF PEOPLE

VS.

Corporate law, in my view, generally regards the
corporation as a commonwealth of dollars. Shares, each
representing an equal equity investment in the firm, are the
citizens of this polity; it is they and they alone who are granted
the political right to vote, entitled to demand equality, or
barred from immigration and emigration without consent of
the whole. Shares and shares alone are given the right to
invoke the assistance of the law to insist that the firm consider
their interests; in extreme versions of corporate law ideology
(and in Revlon mode" as a matter of corporate law) only the
interests of shares ought to be considered.
In this picture, even the shareholders, in their full
humanity as pensioners, employees, CEOs or progeny of the
robber baron elite, citizens or aliens, parents and children, and
holders of various religious, ethical or aesthetic values,
ultimately disappear. The people who are the corporation in
the ordinary course-employees-never appear in the first
place. They are the concern of some other area of law.
When corporations go bad, however, the firm itself
comes back into focus, not as a evanescent nexus of contracts or
as a commonwealth of shares, but as a sociological entity-a
group of people-with actions and values that cannot be
reduced to those of its component parts.
2

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182

(Del. 1985) (creating duty to maximize share value in narrow circumstances, when the
company's sale has become inevitable).
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This is where Professor Darley starts: From the firm as
a group of people working together, not a pot of money
managed on behalf of its "owners." His puzzle is that people in
firms seem "more recruitable into corrupt practices" than one
would anticipate. His explanation is a combination of
normative drift, group loyalty and social roles that value
"playing rough."
The normative drift argument is a variant on the
famous claim that a frog won't jump out of a pot if you heat it
gently enough. Because it can only identify incremental change
rather than absolute states, it feels perfectly comfortable until
it cooks. Here, the argument is that many scandals begin with
a small deviation and proceed in small increments, so that at
each point the participants can see the next step as merely an
insignificant addition to a commitment already made. They
start out with the typical lawyer's rationalization-if "x" is
permissible, then "almost x" must also be, since the two are so
close as to be indistinguishable. By the point this
rationalization no longer works, participants shift to the
criminal's commitment: I'm in so deep already that a little
more won't hurt.
This story is important, especially for law students,
since it is often the lawyer's role to turn the heat up gently by
pressing the interpretative limits of regulatory norms-but
also to remember that when you press far enough, even in
increments that are each justifiable, you generally end up
cooked. Too many clever arguments without enough grounding
in extra-professional norms ultimately lead to scandal,
corporate collapse or even jail.
But it is on the latter explanations that I want to focus
here. Here, Professor Darley is telling us not about people who
have lost their normative way but about specific choices that
seem correct to them, but wrong to more detached observers.
Sometimes, as he points out, they are even consciously
understood as moral dilemmas, not invisible at all, but great
and traumatic, in which the employee must choose between
loyalties. Then, corporate criminality partakes of classic
tragedy. Pity the person who must choose between friend and
country; only doom can result.
IV.

THE CORPORATION'S CONFLICTING NORMS

As a lawyer rather than a social psychologist or student
of management, my own concerns are centrally normative.
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Corporations exist on the border between two conflicting
sets of norms, and the issues raised by this Symposium can be
seen as resulting from the conflicts between those norms. The
problem, or at least part of it, is not violation of norms so much
as their inappropriate application, following the right norm at
the wrong time or in the wrong place. The normative conflict is
irresolvable, but by highlighting it we can work towards a
better mediation of our contradictory normative intuitions.
Conventional corporate law scholarship, however, has largely
concealed the conflict.
On the one hand, we have the market, governed by
contract law. The basic norms are of John Locke's state of
nature and Adam Smith's market: disinterested strangers
treating each other as means to their own ends, not as Kantian
3 The principles of loving your neighbor-or
ends in themselves."
even your child-as yourself are out of place here; a
marketplace can't function if the bargaining parties view their
opposites as parts of themselves. This is the world of every man
for himself, not one for all and all for one.
To be sure, trade and the division of labor ultimately
result in more stuff for everyone, and cooperation is usually the
only way to achieve private aims. However, any given bargain
is inherently competitive: The more you get, even of the gains
from cooperation, the less I do. An invisible hand may assure
that my selfishness works to the common good (at least under
the right conditions), but in the norms of this role, the common
good, or indeed your personal happiness, is important to me
only to the extent that it makes me more likely to get what I
want.
Even norms as seemingly fundamental to the market as
honesty are justified only in the self-centered utilitarian
S Hobbes,

of course, is the locus classicus

of the fully self-centered

psychology. I choose Smith and Locke precisely because these authors have a clearer
sense of the common good and allow for human sympathy, and yet still model a state of
nature characterized largely by mutually disinterested (if not necessarily hostile)
people. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS (Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776); LOCKE, supra note 6. Rawls, for all
his emphasis on the Kantian view, describes parties behind the veil of ignorance in a
similar fashion, as disinterested rather than mutually concerned. Respect for others is
a constraint, not a consequence of love or community. This disinterestedness, which to
me seems implicit in and necessary to the contract view that individuals join society to
gain benefits for themselves, is central to Rawls's description of the original position
and, therefore, undermines any commitment to treating others as ultimate ends. Were
the bargaining parties allowed true mutual concern (or even envy, a closely related
emotion), it seems likely that they would reject the difference principle as insufficiently
egalitarian. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
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calculus of personal interest. Good bargainers never tell the
whole truth about their intentions or concern themselves with
the needs or expectations of the other side, except as tools to
their own ends. The person who spots a value that others have
missed and takes advantage of it-buying low, selling high-is
an entrepreneurial hero, not a deceitful cheat.
The market is a world of symmetrical autonomy. In the
market, we, or at least our dollars, are all the same in relevant
part, all equal and all presumed to be able to take care of
ourselves. Markets presume that their participants are selfsufficient adults, aware of what they want, able to balance
their needs, desires and capacities, negotiating in their own
interest from a position of reasonable independence. Equally
important, markets price products, not status or person. Equal
products ought to command equal prices; price discrimination
is presumptively improper. Money is green regardless of
pedigree; opportunities should be taken regardless of tradition;
cooperation is bought and sold. The anonymous stock marketwhere buyers and sellers never even learn the other's
identity-is the paradigm; the ideal of blind meritocracy its
extension." The market normative system is radically
disrespectful of persons, status and relationship.
In the market, obligation stems mainly from contractual
promise, and extends only so far as the promise did. This is not
a world of solidarity or natural obligations. Your humanity or
fellow citizenship has only a limited negative claim on me, that
I not violate your individuality by violence or fraud, narrowly
understood. Market participants are free, of course, to care for
others, but to do so in public is nepotism or favoritism-a
violation of market norms even when not illegal. In the public
sphere, if you take the needs of your bargaining counterpart as
values in themselves rather than tools to be used to overcome
him, you are either discriminating or just a mark, a fool or a
sucker. The goal of arms-length bargaining is to get as much as
you can while giving as little as you can, limited only by the
rules of the game.
But if firms hire, fire, buy and sell in the world of the
market, they produce in a different arena altogether. As Coase

"*For further discussion, see, Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Beyond the CounterMajoritarianDifficulty: Judicial Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS
L. REV. 781, 813-15 (2001) (discussing the difference between market and majoritarian
decision-making in a democracy).
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pointed out, were firms just markets, they would not exist."i
Markets are better at being markets. Firms exist because they
can do things that markets cannot do well. In particular, they
replace disinterested contracting with cooperative planning.
Inside the firm, market norms disappear. Instead, the
fundamental legal norm governing employees is agency, with
its strongly asymmetrical fiduciary obligations.
An agent is required to work for her principal. Instead
of maximizing what she can get from a stranger (and relying on
an invisible hand to turn this seemingly selfish behavior into
something socially useful), she must take the principal's ends
as her own. Much as a mother is better off when her child is
better off (without a contractual expectation of payback) or a
patriot wins when the nation wins (even if he is killed in the
process), the norms of agency demand that the employee see
the employer's good as her own. She must put aside her selfinterest (in the market, contractual sense) and concern herself
only with the interests of the other.
Agency is profoundly opposed to the symmetrical
anonymity and mutual indifference of market's strangers. The
market-contract ideal is of blindness to personal characteristics
and relationships-a common carrier open to all comers, an
anonymous stock market, a medieval fair in which ancestral
enemies meet momentarily to trade, charging the same price to
lords and peasants alike, or a Weberian bureaucracy promoting
and deciding on merit alone. In contrast, agents must always
remember who is who. To her principal, the agent owes a
fiduciary duty; that duty requires her to work for the principal
and against (in the market sense) all others. Employees work
for employers, not the other way around: The principal gives
orders and the agent takes them; the employee must set aside
her own interests but the employer need not. Inside the
organization, you obey or you cooperate; with outsiders you
compete. Relationships and status are essential. Until you
know who is agent and who principal, who boss and who
subordinate, who insider and who outsider, you know nothing
at all. The market ideals of anonymity, autonomy and equality
have no place in an agency relationship.

" Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (1937), reprinted
in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAw (1988) 33-57, and in THE
NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson
& Sidney G. Winter eds. 1991).
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This world of agency is defined by group loyalty and
team spirit. The firm should be a team, with each agent
working for the good of the whole (otherwise, it is hard to see
how it could out-compete a market). Instead of the morality of
independence, equality and autonomy, here we have the
morality of self-abnegation, sacrifice, caring and unity. We
work together, to promote our collective good (against the
others). This is a world not of strangers but of family-like
groups, in which each person's actions (and, as Professor
Darley points out, self-understanding) is interrelated with
others'.
We cannot privilege one value system over the other.
Nor can we live by either alone. Market disinterestedness
underpins bureaucratic regularity and offers liberation from
feudal oppression, but threatens to descend into the Hobbesian
war of all against all exemplified by the free market of postcommunist Moscow or civil war Beirut. Agency status and
mutual concern is the foundation of patriotism and social
justice-as well as nationalist riots, mob violence, prejudice
and group-think. Capitalist affluence and democratic liberal
freedom alike depend on both existing and each restrained.
Professor Darley points out the "alternate identities on
offer" in our business corporations, using the example of
Michael Lewis's experiences as a bond trader. Lewis was
shocked to discover that in his employer's view, his client was
the bond desk, not the customer. To modify Professor Darley's
terminology slightly, Lewis was confronted with a choice of
roles and the morals associated with them. According to the
bond desk culture he confronted, he was a member of a team.
The team was the company, and the team contended that team
loyalties trumped legal responsibilities (or alternative views of
who he should have viewed as his team).
Note, though, that the issue here is not selfishness or
greed (at least not Lewis's). Lewis was being asked to be loyal
and self-sacrificing-but to the company, not his client. The
ethical breach was not normlessness, but the wrong norm; not
selfishness, but the wrong team. The alternative identities
available include not just the Commedia del'Arte trickster that
Professor Darley discusses, but the market hard bargainer, the
capitalist entrepreneur, the team player and the loyal
professional.
As Lewis's story demonstrates, when values slip out of
their proper spheres or when the spheres overlap, scandal can
result. In Lewis's case, the issue was how to define his
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fiduciary duties: Was he meant to be working for his employer
or his client, should his loyalty to his (local) teammates trump
loyalty to his client or the more abstract requirements of law?
Often, however, the problem is not defining the team or
limiting its demands. Many corporate problems stem simply
from the conflict between the fiduciary norms of agency within
the firm, which demand self-sacrifice in support of the team,
and the market norms outside it, which demand selfinterestedness. The celebration of unrestrained market in
American political ideology of the last couple of decades has
accentuated the conflict. Thus, a CEO who bargains for as
many stock option grants as he can get or who sells his stock
when the market is up is acting according to market norms.
When he announces that the company is doing well when in
fact it is not, he is bluffing in the way that contractual
bargainers regularly do. When he fires employees for no reason
other than maximizing corporate profit, or treats their pensions
not as a social good but as a cost to be cut in any way legally
permissible, or encourages his traders to use the rules of a
semi-deregulated market to generate private profits at the
expense of the California public, he is acting quite properly if
the proper norms to follow are those of the disinterested
market. In a market, strangers may be exploited to the
maximum extent permitted by law. Indeed, if he cooks the
company's books to make it appear to be worth more than it is,
he may be acting as a faithful agent, putting aside his own
interests (and integrity) in order to aid the firm and its
shareholders. 6
In these scandals, the problem is not lawless
selfishness, corruption or poorly socialized sociopaths. The evil
is not normlessness but the wrong norm in the wrong place at
the wrong time. It is a complex problem that will require
complex analysis and complex solutions.
V.

MEDIATING THE CONFLICTING NORMS

Combining Professor Treviflo's contribution with
Professor Darley's, we can take the point further. Corporate
"8The

court

in Kamin v.

American Express accepted

precisely this

explanation of a corporate manager's decision to account for a transaction in a way that
cost the company real money but made its profit appear greater, and therefore, if the
stock market was deceived, would keep its stock price higher. See 383 N.Y.S. 2d 807
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
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wrongdoing often results from a conflict of norms, rather than
a simple refusal to act ethically. In these cases, the problem is
not "bad apples" rejecting the norms they are expected to apply,
but institutions imposing inappropriate norms (as in Lewis's
case) or a corporate actor making what we-after the factview as inappropriate choices among conflicting normative
demands each of which requires setting aside the employee's
own interests or desires. Importantly, when this happens,
actors may experience their wrong-doing as self-sacrificing,
ethical and externally constrained, not as an act of selfish evil
at all.
To be sure, sometimes bad apple explanations are
correct. Employees sometimes place their own self-interest
above their obligations to others-Bering Bank failed when a
trader made a bad trade and then covered it up rather than
admit to his mistake, and many of the top executives who
falsified their books profited directly from the artificially high
stock prices resulting from their lies.
But the articles by Professor Treviflo and Professor
Darley suggest that this type of corruption-variants on
embezzlement-is not the most useful paradigm for corporate
wrongdoing. Without ignoring outright criminals, we should
focus our primary attention on ordinary people caught in a web
of conflicting norms-norms that are mediated, explained and
ultimately enforced by corporate structures under the control of
the CEO.
The contradictory norms are fundamental. First, we
operate under a background regime that glorifies self-help,
even at the expense of others. The basic market norm
encourages hard bargaining, thinking of yourself and your
needs without any consideration of others except as tools to
your own ends: that is what we call arms-length bargaining,
and success at it is success in the business world. Competing
hard is a good thing, not a bad one.
Of course, at the same time that we glorify strong
competitors, we expect them to observe certain limits. Athletes
should play fair, not beat up their opponents or take
performance-enhancing drugs. Businessmen should create
better products for less, not lie about the product, falsify their
books, or shake-down competitors. These rules act as
constraints to a game otherwise structured by a different set of
norms.
Predictably, a certain number of people will fail to
observe the limits, getting so caught up in the game that they

1228

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4

forget that winning is not everything. Basketball players foul,
seemingly patriotic commanders condone or order torture,
publicists and advertisers spin, and accountants stretch. But
they do so to benefit the team, not necessarily to benefit
themselves. Perhaps they are "bad apples" in the sense that
they have lost their sense of where playing hard meets playing
fair, but more importantly, they may also be altruistic team
players-they are cheating for the glory of the team, not
themselves. Perhaps this is why we often seem so conflicted
about punishing them.
Second, corporations create their own internal norms of
accepted and expected behavior. To be a professional requires,
in most instances, putting aside your own beliefs and adopting
the goals of your client. Agency law principles (and their
ordinary morality equivalents) usually say the same thing for
employees: An employee, on the job, acts ethically and properly
if she puts aside her values and adopts her employer's. Enron
famously took these potentially conflicting rules to the
paradoxical extreme, telling its employees that the way to be
team players-to work for the firm-was to compete as hard
and ruthlessly as possible-for themselves as individuals. 7
Corporations, like other groups and bureaucracies, can
be structured to maximize group solidarity or not. In this age of
the imperial CEO, the corporate world seems especially intent
on creating solidarity in the work force. Managers train in the
techniques of creating team spirit, team norms, team ethics
and team loyalty. Whether by Professor Tom Tyler's procedural
justice, tent-revival meeting style hortatory, or simple "us
against them" competition, well-run firms work to create and
maintain norms of employee loyalty to the firm.
problems-most
well-known
loyalty has
Group
knit groups
Tightly
importantly, for our purposes, group-think.
tend to develop their own internal norms, as Professor Darley
points out, with most group members recreating themselves to
fit their understanding of the demands of the group. But a
group that adopts a uniform and closed analysis of the world
will be poorly equipped to deal with changing external
challenges. When everyone thinks the same way, no one will
see the errors in the standard thinking, whether the problem is
7 Enron was famous for its harsh intra-firm competition, in which employees

were regularly required to rank each other, with the winners receiving bonuses and
promotions and the losers being fired.
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false analysis of the external world (seeing weapons of mass
destruction where there are none, or not seeing competitive
threats where they are clear) or normative drift.
With the collapse of the unions, the main external
countervailing force to corporate loyalty is the corrosive
individualism of the market itself. Employees are not only
members of the team influenced by norms of team spirit and
mutual responsibility, but also potentially out for themselves in
a market governed by self-interest. Thus, market norms
suggest, as the Wall Street Journal's career management
column regularly does, that the intelligent employee will
always focus on creating the appearance of team loyalty
without succumbing to its reality, and, as Dilbert teaches each
day, a cynical distrust of anything "the Boss" might say. These
market norms limit the power of group loyalty and groupthink, but may not do so in particularly useful ways. Cynical
self-interestedness leads to conformity, not to the sort of brave
dissent that functional institutions need.
One aspect of corporate wrongdoing then, is the
difficulty of mediating fundamentally contradictory norms. We
demand that corporate agents cause the corporation to compete
hard, treat the people they contract with at arms length as
tools to the end of profit, set aside their personal political and
moral beliefs while on the job in order to do the work they are
paid for. We demand that employees be team players and make
clear that the team is the firm, regardless of the needs of the
greater society. Paradoxically, that is, we demand that
employees altruistically and selflessly serve-but the cause
they are to serve is simply the self-interested firm, which is
free to treat employees as competitive opponents rather than
teammates. It is not surprising that some fail at this difficult
game.
Moreover, one key way in which we identify ethical
behavior in ourselves and others is self-denial. Kant claimed
that the highest form of moral behavior is that which does not
benefit the actor at all. I suspect he was wrong," but the kernel
18

The Kantian formulation, in my view, fails to capture the importance of

other-directed team behavior, which is deeply satisfying to the actor. Mothers do
sacrifice for their children as patriots do for their country, but the sacrifice is not the
essence or the test of the morality of their actions. Rather than sacrificing our own
good, within a team we treat the other as ourself, the good of any team member as our
own good. Moreover, emphasizing sacrifice suggests, as I note in the text, that
selfishness is the main cause of evil, missing the important point that each form of
good self-sacrifice has an accompanying evil form. People are often happy to sacrifice
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of truth is clear. The clearest instance of unethical and
unprofessional behavior is pure self-interested selfishness:
stealing from the client.
This agency understanding that the ethical thing to do
is to set aside your own views and instead adopt the profitmaximizing norm of the corporation is so strong that it may
cause decision-makers to act contrary to their views as citizens
even when profit is not at stake. It is often difficult to tell what
the right thing to do is and even more often difficult to tell
what the profitable thing to do is. But the Kantian
understanding that "morality hurts" allows a quick (if often
misleading) heuristic. The one time that I know I am acting as
a good agent, setting aside my own views in the interest of the
team, is when I do something I know that I (in my citizen role)
would disapprove of. The easiest way to show that I am acting
properly is to act improperly. And in the corporate context, this
means I should do what is profitable, regardless of whether it is
socially useful.
Moreover, I believe the heuristic is commonly taken one
step further. Often I may be unsure whether something is
profitable, but confident that it is wrong. The agency
understanding powerfully (if illogically) suggests that I should
pick the wrong action. Virtue hurts; agents are supposed to set
aside their own beliefs. By picking something I know I would
disapprove of in my private role, I know I am acting as an
agent, even if profit remains elusive.
It may be hard to prove whether the strictures of the
corporate social responsibility movement increase or decrease
long term profit. But it is easy to see that as citizens, we will
find many of them attractive. Rejecting them, even in the
absence of any actual evidence regarding their costs or benefits
to the firm, is an easy and psychologically clear way of proving
that the decision-maker is acting in role, as a team member.
Perversely, then, actors attempting to do the right thing (in
their role as agents) may end up making decisions they know
are wrong (in their role as citizens) and which do not even
maximize profit.
Team players act on behalf of the team, not themselves.
When the subcontractors described by Professor Darley decided
to falsify test results, they knew they were risking their
themselves for evil causes, as every student of the virulent forms of nationalism,
religion, fascism and communism knows.
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personal careers and freedom. They were setting aside their
own interests in favor of the interests of a whole greater than
themselves. Professor Darley describes this as adopting a social
role and proposes various villains. But in a very simple and
clearly understandable sense, the role adopted is simply the
good and loyal team player. This is ethical behavior-self
sacrifice for a cause. Good employees don't shirk and they don't
tattle either.
The problem, then, is not (only) bad apples, selfishness
or insufficiently socialized individuals who do not understand
how to play fair. It is also morality in the cause of the firm-a
type of local patriotism. Self-sacrifice in the cause of profit.
Setting aside your own moral views to do what the job requires,
distasteful as that may be. Enron's traders viewed themselves
as heroes, and on this level they were right: heroes fighting to
oppress the ratepayers on behalf of the firm and its
shareholders.
We have then this paradox. If the purpose of the
corporation is to make a profit, as many have claimed, then the
way that an employee fulfills her ethical obligation on the job is
by promoting the corporation's profit. But despite Milton
Friedman's famous claim that the ethical obligation of business
is profit, placing profit above all is precisely the definition of
unethical behavior in the corporate context." Ethical behavior
in the corporate context means understanding that loyalty,
honesty and relationships with your customers, your suppliers,
your employers, your country, even the earth itself, are
sometimes more important than short-term (or even long term)
profits. Ethical behavior on the individual level means knowing
when to buck the group norms, when to stand up for one
normative system in opposition to another, when to violate the
agency norm of setting aside your own sense of right and wrong
and to selfishly follow your own lights. On the institutional
level, ethical behavior requires building in safeguards against
group-think, limits to the pursuit of short-term profit,

19

Even Friedman acknowledges that pursuit of profit must be restrained by

external legal norms of "deception and fraud," although he does not explain why these
violations differ from the additional ethical obligations ones he rejects. "There is one
and only one social responsibility of business-to use it resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the
game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or
fraud." Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibilityof Business is to Increase its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970) (magazine).
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commitments to particular relationships and focus on products
and services rather than stock market prices.
When an entire institution goes bad, it is not the result
of a "bad apple." Rather, it is the result of employees or
corporate agents doing exactly what they think they are
supposed to do under the circumstances, even when they have
strong misgivings about whether the actions are proper from a
societal point of view. As Professor Darley notes, in several of
the most famous cases of corporate wrongdoing, the employees
who did the bad acts were perfectly aware that they were
acting improperly according to social norms, and even worried
about criminal liability. The point is, however, that as they
took actions they knew were wrong-falsifying test results,
falsifying financial data, distorting the California electric
market to "steal" from Aunt Millie-these employees saw
themselves as acting properly within their job. Much as
soldiers learn to kill in the cause of the nation, Enron's
employees learned to pillage in the cause of the firm. The moral
thing to do, at least so long as you have not resigned from your
job, appeared to be to set aside individual morality and act in
the interests of the team, to do what was necessary to win.
Team loyalty and internal corporate norms trumped
national patriotism and national norms. Indeed, in the end,
they even trumped profit: Profit, like happiness, is one of those
things best achieved by aiming elsewhere. The exclusive
emphasis on short term profit in each of the institutions caught
up in the great turn of the century scandals is not accidental.
In the end, a corporation can only out-compete markets by
being good at things markets are not good at, and the most
important of those is long term relationships. But short term
profit demands treating all relationships instrumentally, and
that, in turn, destroys them, and with them, the basis of future
profits. Laser-like focus on profits, as Enron demonstrates, is
fundamentally incompatible with actually earning them.
The issue, then, is corporate culture, and as Professor
Trevifio has pointed out, corporate culture starts at the top.
CEOs have enormous influence on the way in which their
corporations respond to these normative demands, through
modeling as well as their decisions about how to structure the
corporation, about what measures of success to emphasize,
about how and who to promote or not, about how to resolve
conflicts between the alternative norms and identities "on
offer." Even if corporate culture is never entirely under CEO
control, the contributors to this Symposium make clear that in
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fact CEOs do matter, that it is not enough to simply dismiss
them either as rapacious kleptocrats or as absent minders
unfairly held responsible for the wrongdoings of subordinates.
VI.

CONCLUSION

From a regulatory perspective, several consequences
follow from this discussion of normative conflict.
First, we should not fall into the mistake of thinking
that the problem is centrally one of sociopaths, or to be dealt
with by criminal law. Soldiers kill but they are not murderers
(unless they are soldiers for a particularly evil state). Many of
our corporate wrongdoers, particularly at the lower levels, are
not motivated by selfishness but by selflessness. This means
that obtaining convictions under conventional criminal law is
going to be difficult: Some of the worst malefactors will be able
to demonstrate that they were not thinking of themselves as
they did their destruction. In the manner Hannah Arendt
called the "banality of evil," they were good bureaucrats, doing
their jobs as they understood them, according to the norms of
the job. Criminal law looks for corruption-self-interest where
loyalty is required-but the problem here may often be loyalty
where rebellion was needed.
Relatedly, and more tentatively, it is time for further
examination of whether criminal law and regulatory control of
the corporation ought to focus more on the CEO as an
individual and less on the firm as a legal person. Currently, the
corporation itself is often the target of regulatory law: fines are
imposed on it, injunctions are entered against it, and so on.
Unfortunately, when firms are penalized, many humans who
were not in positions of authority are likely to suffer. Thus, for
example, when Enron went bankrupt due to institutional
wrongdoing, thousands of lower level employees lost their jobs
and pensions. Professor Trevifto's research suggests that we
might do better-causing less disruption to the economy and
less harm to innocent corporate participants-if regulatory and
criminal law took more account of the internal workings of
corporations. If CEOs are important, then we should be able to
reform corporations by changes at the top before writing off the
particular corporation as incorrigible." To the extent that CEOs
20

Warren Buffett's reform of Salomon Brothers following its bond trading

scandal might be an example.
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can affect the corporate culture, then they, rather than the
institution, ought to be held liable for its misdeeds.
Second, both at the legal level and within the
organization, we need to think harder about what works and
what does not.
Corporate law is silent on ethics. The state law that
creates our corporations and governs their basic decisionmaking processes does not require any consideration of the
claims of stakeholders, society as a whole or even the real
human beings who own shares. We rely on the price
mechanism and external regulation to control our corporations,
but build nothing into the firms to prevent them from seeking
to subvert those systems or to induce them to explicitly
consider any countervailing values.
For several decades, corporate law scholars, even more
than the case law, have taught that the only ethical course of
behavior for a corporation is the unmitigated pursuit of profit.
This laser-like focus on profit is precisely our problem, not the
solution.
Corporate law scholarship can most usefully aid this
project of creating a more profitable and more committed
corporate sector by exploring the ways in which the law
structures our existing markets, to their benefit and detriment,
rather than by pretending that markets somehow exist
abstracted from a legal framework. We have no agreement on
how to resolve the conflicts among our normative systems (and
perhaps such agreement is impossible). Still, we can have a
fuller discussion of what it means to be ethical, of when market
pressures ought to be resisted, of short term and long term
conflicts, and so on, if we escape the trap of market
determinism and the unfounded faith that in the end markets
will automatically take us where we want to go.
CEOs, it is now clear, are critical. They, along with
corporate law and both legal and business scholarship, can
begin to engage the challenge of a richer understanding of
corporate purpose, or they can insist that the stock ticker must
rule. They can reinforce the cultural influences suggesting that
the only proper role of a corporate employee is to help report a
quarterly profit, or they can counter them. They can treat their
employees as disposable means to a corporate end, or as the
corporation itself. They can, by their choices about their own
compensation, further the cynical view that the corporate world
is only about getting your own, or they can join the corporate
team and make it a more genuine enclave in the market.

20051

DISCUSSING CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR

1235

Corporate law itself could start by abandoning the
internal affairs doctrine, so that a genuine competition between
the states, seeking to affect market incentives instead of simply
pandering to them, can develop. Once the larger states begin to
take responsibility for the governance of their largest economic
entities, a thicker corporate law might move us in the direction
of a more functional set of norms, practices and incentives.
Specifically, corporate law should begin exploring
mandatory internal compliance mechanisms. Although courts
eventually concluded that it might be a breach of fiduciary duty
for a bank to hand cash to tellers with no safeguards, they have
imposed no parallel requirement that firms have an ethics
manager. We know that group-think is a problem in all
bureaucratic organizations. Now legislatures need to consider
mandating ombudsmen or similar parallel reporting systems to
lessen the likelihood of group-think and to catch outright
corruption. Similarly, courts need to consider whether
corporate law fiduciary norms require more than avoiding
unprofitable illegality while maximizing profit-whether,
indeed, it isn't a corporate law requirement that firms observe
the spirit and not merely the letter of our other regulatory
schemes.
More fundamentally, the profit maximization norm
itself is dysfunctional even in the narrowest sense. Part of our
problem is that too close a focus on profit maximization focuses
firm actors on the wrong parts of our normative systems and,
in the end, is not profit maximizing at all. While courts
generally do not require anything resembling a strong version
of short-term profit-maximization, the market structure in
which publicly traded corporations operate, and the ethos of
our business and law schools, often do press managers in that
direction.
We need countervailing power structures within the
corporation. Profit is best pursued indirectly, by commitment to
the products and services that create demand, together with
commitments to the relationships that make a corporation a
viable alternative to markets. Currently, the corporate
decision-makers-upper management-are answerable to a
board elected only by shares. The short-termism and narrow
focus of the stock market become overly influential almost
automatically as a result. Boards need to have built-in
pressures to respond to other values and other commitments as
well, including both representatives of those values and
interests and answerability to them.
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We need an external reporting system, modeled after
successful practices of the airline accident reporting system or
the CDC's emerging hospital error reporting systems, to
generate systematic knowledge about which ethical breaches
regularly repeat and under what circumstances.
We need restrictions on corporate interventions in the
regulatory system. An organization that has as its central
mission the pursuit of profit restrained only by the limits
imposed by law will always have a tendency to subvert the
restrictions on it. Business corporations by their nature need to
be policed; we need to keep them out of the business of
eliminating their policemen.
We need to seek ways to increase team behavior inside
the corporation: mutual commitment and joint enterprise. This
is mainly an issue for management and those who educate
them, rather than the law, but not entirely. The current
structure of the public corporation invites too close an alliance
between short-term profit oriented institutional shareholders
(reflecting the problematic dynamics of any market and our
particular stock market) and managers bribed and beaten into
a similar view.'
We need limits on CEO compensation relative to
ordinary employees for the simple reason that too big an
income gap automatically creates distance and the "out of
touch" CEO identified by Professor Trevifio as the source of
ethics problems and bad business decisions alike. While there
is strong evidence that in at least some cases CEO
" In theory, of course, institutional shareholders, being permanent investors,
ought to be concerned about the long term prospects of the corporations they invest in,
and quarterly results should be important only to the extent that they accurately
predict those. If the newer theories are correct that excessive focus on short-term
results is bad for long-term results, institutional investors ought to see this and correct
their behavior. Indeed, the success of Berkshire-Hathaway and the current popularity
of hedge funds may reflect those investors' ability to take long term views. But more
often, institutional investors are structurally incapable of ignoring short-term
fluctuations. Mutual funds, for example, must respond to the short-term vagaries of
their own investors. Even institutions with more stable investment pools are typically
staffed by decision-makers whose careers depend on beating the market every quarter.
Our longest term investors, therefore, are famous for too often acting as if they were
the shortest-term ones.
Moreover, there is little reason to believe that this market can self-correct.
It is notoriously difficult to distinguish good investment managers (including in the
underlying corporations) from poor ones, a problem made more difficult by the endgame problems posed by the fact that both on Wall Street and in the chief executive
offices most actors are already contemplating retirement by the time they arrive. Thus,
high reliance on quarterly results is not obviously irrational from an individual
perspective even though it is harmful from a social one.
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compensation has become so large that it materially affects
corporate profits directly, that problem seems to me less likely
to demand urgent legal intervention: When the market
concludes that CEO compensation is hurting the prospects of
future returns to stock ownership, stock price drops are a fairly
effective method of enforcing its will.
And because any reform that empowers employees or
relationships relative to the stock market will tend to reduce
the constant revolution of commitment-less capitalism, we need
to work to lessen some external sources of friction in our
system. We need to allow our industrial unions to organize by
industry rather than by plant, so that they can stop being a
lobbying force for obsolete plants and so that managers do not
have a constant incentive to churn physical capital simply to
union bust. We need to separate health and retirement benefits
from specific firms for exactly the same reason, so that
employees can change jobs more readily and less traumatically
and so that employers don't function under constant stock
market pressure to find new and creative ways to abandon past
commitments.
But most of all, we need to recognize that market
Darwinism, like the natural kind, can lead to success, to
extraordinarily strange, creative and unexpected uses of
existing resources (the panda's thumb, the bat's wing), or
simply to extinction. Fitness in a Darwinian world means only
that you've survived so far. Stock market success comes from
maximizing stock price, not from maximizing ethics, human
decency, or even wealth-except to the extent that we can
figure out how to make stock prices reflect human values. If we
are to harness the wonderful power of the market to our own
good-to human values of well-being, justice and the good
life-we must always remember that the invisible hand is ours,
and that if it is leading us in directions we don't like, we can
redirect it elsewhere. The choice is not between market or law,
but between legally regulated markets that mandate or
encourage us to abandon our other commitments and different
regulation that could better harness the power of the market to
work for us. We are the masters; the question is how to use our
mastery.

